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Abstract
We investigate the empirical relation between ambiguity aversion,
risk aversion and portfolio choices. We match administrative panel
data on portfolio choices with survey data on preferences over ambi-
guity and risk. We report three main ndings. First, conditional on
participation, ambiguity averse investors hold riskier portfolios. Sec-
ond, they rebalance their portfolio in a contrarian direction relative
to the market. Accordingly, their exposure to risk is more stable over
time. Third, their portfolios experience higher returns, but they are
also more sensitive to market trends. In several instances, the e¤ects of
ambiguity aversion stand in sharp contrast with those of risk aversion.
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1 Introduction
Households have to take more and more complex nancial decisions, whose
consequences are often di¢ cult to predict (Ryan, Trumbull and Tufano
(2011), Guiso and Sodini (2012)). Faced with such large uncertainty, house-
holds may not behave according to traditional expected utility theory. A
large body of literature has developed alternative models of decision mak-
ing centered on ambiguity -that is, in Knight (1921)s words, unmeasurable
uncertainty- as opposed to risk -that is, measurable uncertainty. Ambigu-
ity has been proposed as a key element for explaining householdsnancial
decisions and the functioning of nancial markets, also in relation to recent
nancial crises.1
This paper provides eld evidence on the relation between ambiguity
aversion and portfolio choices. While several laboratory experiments doc-
ument the e¤ects of ambiguity aversion, evidence from the eld is much
scarcer.2 We exploit a unique data set in which administrative panel data
on portfolio choices are matched with survey data on preferences over ambi-
guity and risk. Our aim is to document whether ambiguity aversion a¤ects
portfolio choices and whether this e¤ect may di¤er, even qualitatively, from
the one of risk aversion.
We focus on three fundamental aspects of portfolio choices: how much
risk households take; how their risk exposure evolves over time through
portfolio rebalancing (or lack thereof); and what is the performance of their
portfolio. These aspects relate to some of the most important themes in
the theoretical literature on portfolio choices under ambiguity. This litera-
ture provides (sometimes conicting) testable predictions and suggests how
portfolio choices may respond di¤erently to attitudes towards ambiguity vs.
risk.
Regarding risk taking, ambiguity aversion has been shown to limit par-
ticipation in the stock market (Dow and Werlang (1992)). Conditional on
participation, however, the relation between ambiguity aversion and risk
taking could be positive or negative.3 As for rebalancing, a recent litera-
ture shows that ambiguity aversion may lead to forms of portfolio inertia
1Some contributions on ambiguity and nancial choices are discussed below. Epstein
and Schneider (2010) and Guidolin and Rinaldi (2013) provide recent insightful reviews.
On the role of ambiguity in nancial crises, see e.g. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008)
and Caballero and Simsek (2013).
2For a broad survey of the experimental literature on ambiguity aversion, see Traut-
mann and Van De Kuilen (2013). In particular, Ahn, Choi, Gale and Kariv (2007) study
how ambiguity aversion a¤ects portfolio choices and Bossaerts, Ghirardato, Guarnaschelli
and Zame (2010) focus on its e¤ects on asset prices. Later, we review some recent contri-
butions drawing from eld data.
3Uppal and Wang (2003) provide a model in which ambiguity aversion reinforces risk
aversion; Klibano¤, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005) and Gollier (2011) report examples in
which ambiguity aversion may increase risk taking.
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in that households need not respond to news or to shocks to risk premia.4
Inertia a¤ects the amount of information revealed by prices, as well as their
level and volatility (Condie and Ganguli (2012)). Finally, alternative models
have been proposed in which ambiguity aversion can either reduce or im-
prove portfolio performance.5 Understanding performance is also important
for the debate on the long run survival of ambiguity averse investors (see
e.g. Condie (2008) and Guerdijkova and Sciubba (2012)).
In order to guide our empirical investigation, and organize some of these
insights in a unied framework, we rst develop a simple portfolio choice
model with a riskless and a risky asset. Building on Epstein and Schnei-
der (2010), we assume that both returns and variance of the risky asset are
ambiguous: Investors know that higher returns are associated with higher
variance, but they do not know the exact form of the trade-o¤. In line with
some of the themes already outlined, we derive the following predictions.
First, ambiguity averse investors are less likely to invest in the uncertain
asset. At the same time, conditional on participation, ambiguity aversion
may lead to higher risk taking in that it may induce investors to "underes-
timate" the variance of the returns. Third, ambiguity averse investors may
be insensitive to small changes in risk premia and so their portfolios may
display lower uctuations over time.
Our empirical analysis is based on portfolio data obtained from a large
insurance company in France. They focus on a popular investment product
among French households dubbed assurance vie. In this product, households
decide how to allocate their wealth between relatively safe vs. relatively risky
assets, and they can freely change their allocation over time. Our data record
the value and detailed composition of the clientsportfolio of contracts at
a monthly frequency for about eight years. Moreover, for each contract, we
can construct the corresponding market returns (using Datastream).
Clients were also asked to answer (online while on the phone with a sur-
veyor) a survey that we have designed. The survey has two main purposes.
First, while portfolio data only concern households activities within the
company, in the survey we gather a more complete picture of households
portfolios as well as of various socio-demographic data. Second, we elicit
householdspreferences over risk and ambiguity.
Following standard procedures, we build our main measure of risk aver-
sion by asking subjects to choose between risky vs. safe lotteries. For
ambiguity aversion, we ask subjects to choose between risky vs. ambigu-
ous lotteries, that is between lotteries with known vs. unknown probability
4See e.g. Garlappi, Uppal and Wang (2007), Illeditsch (2011), Ganguli, Condie and
Illeditsch (2012).
5 In Uppal and Wang (2003) and Boyle, Garlappi, Uppal and Wang (2012), for exam-
ple, ambiguity aversion may lead to under diversication and so reduce performance. In
Garlappi et al. (2007), instead, ambiguity averse investors may experience higher perfor-
mances.
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distributions over the nal payo¤s. These lotteries were hypothetical and
involved both gains and losses.6
We start by investigating static portfolio choices. We nd only weak
evidence that ambiguity aversion reduces the probability to hold assurance
vie contracts containing risky assets (a form of participation in the stock
market). At the same time, however, we nd that conditional on participa-
tion ambiguity averse individuals tend to take more risk. Their contracts
are 11% more likely to contain risky assets in a proportion exceeding the
median in the sample. Put di¤erently, their contracts display a 7% higher
share of wealth invested in risky assets (relative to an average of 56%). This
e¤ect is robust as we employ alternative measures of risk taking. As in
our model, ambiguity aversion may induce higher risk taking and so have a
clearly distinct e¤ect from that of risk aversion.
We then turn to the dynamics of householdsportfolios. In particular,
we focus on how households exposure to risk, as measured by the share
of risky assets in their portfolios, evolves over time. Using each contracts
market returns, we can also distinguish changes in risk exposure which are
driven by di¤erential market returns of risky vs. riskless assets from those
which result from an active choice of the household (as in Calvet, Campbell
and Sodini (2009)).
We show that ambiguity averse investors tend to keep their risk exposure
relatively constant over time. Their contracts are 7% less likely to experience
monthly uctuations which exceed the median in the sample. Moreover,
they tend to rebalance their portfolio in a contrarian direction relative to
the market. Specically, ambiguity averse individuals are about 2% less
likely to chase returns (that is, to move wealth from assets which have
performed relatively poorly to assets which have performed relatively well in
their portfolios), relative to an average of 43%. These results are una¤ected
by the inclusion of measures of market experiences (such as trends in own
portfolio returns) which may a¤ect householdsexpectations.
Our third set of results concern the performance of these portfolios.
We nd no evidence that ambiguity aversion induces suboptimal portfo-
lio choices. Instead, ambiguity averse investors experience about 0:014%
higher returns per month (relative to an average of 0:36%). The di¤erence
remains signicant if we control for the riskiness of the contract, and it be-
comes larger if we restrict to risky contracts. At the same time, conditional
on risk taking, their returns are more exposed to market trends. In particu-
lar, relative to ambiguity neutral investors, their monthly returns are 0:2%
higher in good times and 0:13% lower in bad times.
Finally, we perform some robustness checks. We investigate whether our
6We have also elicited preferences through other questions, and the consistency of
the various measures turned out to be good. Moreover, we nd no strong (if anything,
negative) correlation between ambiguity aversion and risk aversion, which suggests that
the two variables reect di¤erent individual traits. We refer to Section 3 for details.
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estimates may be driven by omitted behavioral characteristics, and show
that the e¤ects of ambiguity aversion are robust to the inclusion of measures
of investorssophistication, condence, and time preferences. We also shed
some light on whether our ndings appear representative of households
behaviors in their broader portfolio. We show that our results hold (they are
sometimes stronger) for clients with a large fraction of wealth invested in the
company, for which the observed portfolio is probably more representative
of the overall portfolio.
In the next sections, we further discuss each of these ndings as well as
their relation with the existing literature. Already at this stage, however,
we wish to highlight some of their implications from a somewhat broader
perspective. First, our results show that measures of preferences as elicited
in surveys can be informative about choices made in the real world. We nd
it remarkable that these measures show some predictive power in a context
like portfolio choices in which heterogeneity is large and often di¢ cult to
explain with standard observables.
Moreover, we believe that our results are strongly suggestive that ambi-
guity and risk are fundamentally distinct objects, not only conceptually but
also from an empirical viewpoint. In several instances, ambiguity aversion
displays opposite e¤ects than risk aversion. In our view, this provides sup-
port to the view that ambiguity aversion cannot be reduced to an additional
source of aversion to risk.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next subsection, we review our
contribution in relation to the existing literature. A model is provided in
Section 2. In Section 3, we present the data. In Section 4, we describe
our method for eliciting ambiguity and risk preferences and provide some
descriptive statistics on their determinants. Our main results on portfolio
choices appear in Section 5. In Section 6, we discuss robustness checks. We
conclude in Section 7. A detailed description of our variables, gures and
tables are in the Appendix.
1.1 Literature
To our knowledge, this study is the rst to provide evidence on the e¤ect
of ambiguity aversion on nancial decisions as observed in administrative
data. As such, it contributes to two streams of literature. First, we relate
to the household nance literature by looking at the determinants of house-
holdsnancial decisions. The literature is growing rapidly and we refer to
Campbell (2006) and Guiso and Sodini (2012) for excellent recent surveys.
Compared to this literature, our main novelty is in matching survey and
administrative data. While as pointed out this does not provide a detailed
picture of the entire householdsportfolios (as for example in Calvet, Camp-
bell and Sodini (2007) and Calvet et al. (2009)), it o¤ers the opportunity
to study the relation between behavioral traits and real choices. This seems
5
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to accommodate (some of) the desiderata expressed in Campbell, Jackson,
Madrian and Tufano (2011).7
We know of only a few studies combining survey and administrative data.
Dorn and Huberman (2005) focus on the relation between risk aversion,
(perceived) nancial sophistication and portfolio choices; Alvarez, Guiso and
Lippi (2012) analyze the frequency with which investors observe and trade
their portfolio; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2013) and Ho¤mann, Post and
Pennings (2013) study how risk aversion has changed following the nancial
crisis; Bauer and Smeets (2014) and Riedl and Smeets (2014) investigate
how social preferences a¤ect socially responsible investments. None of these
studies focuses on ambiguity preferences as we do.
Second, we contribute to the literature on ambiguity preferences. Models
of ambiguity attitudes have ourished over the past two decades and we refer
to Etner, Jeleva and Tallon (2012) for a recent review. As already mentioned
in the Introduction, while these models have received considerable attention
also in relation to nancial decisions, empirical studies are quite scant.8
Most closely related to our study, Dimmock, Kouwenberg and Wakker
(2013) and Dimmock, Kouwenberg, Mitchell and Peijnenburg (2013) exploit
large representative surveys in which subjects are asked about their prefer-
ences as well as about their portfolio holdings. Dimmock, Kouwenberg and
Wakker (2013) nd no correlation between ambiguity aversion and stock
market participation in a Dutch sample. Dimmock, Kouwenberg, Mitchell
and Peijnenburg (2013) show that stock market participation as well as the
share of the wealth invested in equity are negatively related to ambiguity
aversion in the American Life Panel sample.
We share with these authors a similar methodology to elicit ambiguity
aversion (but our subjects receive no monetary reward in relation to their
choices) and a similar focus on the relation with nancial choices. Their
data are based on surveys, and they are larger in size and in scope. Our
administrative data provide more details for the specic investment at study
as well as a panel structure, which allows us to address di¤erent questions
such as portfolio dynamics and performance.
2 Model
We rst develop a simple model that highlights the various forces at work
in portfolio choice under ambiguity. We build on a model presented in
7They report an "urgent need" for household-level eld data which would provide better
accuracy and granularity than standard surveys and which would be even more useful if
matched with survey data on householdsbeliefs and objectives.
8Recent developments include Maccheroni, Marinacci and Ru¢ no (2013) on mean-
variance preferences; Epstein and Ji (2013) and Lin and Riedel (2014) on dynamic portfolio
choices; Collard, Mukerji, Sheppard and Tallon (2012) and Ju and Miao (2012) on the
equity premium puzzle.
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Epstein and Schneider (2010) in which ambiguity bears both on the mean
and the variance of the asset returns. We extend it by considering general
CRRA utility functions and introducing an explicit parameterization of the
investors attitudes towards ambiguity.
Consider an agent who has to allocate her initial wealth W0 among two
assets, one safeand one ambiguous.She has a utility function over nal
wealth W1 dened as
u(W1) =
W 1 1
1   ;
where  is the coe¢ cient of constant relative risk aversion. She can choose
to hold a fraction  of her wealth in the ambiguous asset, and (1  ) in the
safe asset. The safe return is denoted Rf and rf = log(1 +Rf ).
The ambiguous return is denoted eR, with er = log(1 + eR). The returns
are known to be lognormally distributed (with mean r and variance 2)
but the investor is uncertain of the truedistribution. As in Epstein and
Schneider (2010), uncertainty is described by a single parameter x; which
a¤ects positively both the mean and the variance of the returns. The investor
knows that the ambiguous asset can have either low return and low volatility
or high return and high volatility, but not the exact values. Specically,
mean returns are given by r = r + x and their variance by 2 = 2 + x,
where  is a known positive parameter and x is an index of the ambiguity
on the nancial markets which takes value in an interval [x; x]:
We assume, in the spirit of Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon and Vergnaud (2008),
that the investor, facing this set of possible laws for the returns, considers
that the centralone, indexed by x^ = (x+ x)=2, is more salient. She then
wants to insure that her decision is robustto other distributions around
this central one. Her concern for robustness, which we interpret as her
ambiguity attitude, is captured by a parameter  2 [0; 1]. When  = 0, she
just considers the central scenario and does not care for robustness. When
 = 1, she puts all the weight on the worst possible scenario.
Denoting x = x+(1 )x^ and x = x+(1 )x^, the maximization
problem is thus:
max
2[0;1]
min
x2[x;x]
Ex
fW 1 1
1   ;
s.t. fW1 = (( eR   Rf ) + (1 + Rf ))W0. Hence, taking logs and using the
approximation of log returns on wealth developed by Campbell and Viceira
(2002), the problem the decision maker has to solve is:
max
2[0;1]
min
x2[x;x]
(r + x  rf ) + 1
2
(2 + x)  1
2
2(2 + x): (1)
7
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For a given x, we can dene
?(x) =
r + x  rf + 12(2 + x)
(2 + x)
; (2)
that is the optimal share of the ambiguous asset when the return follows a
log normal distribution of mean r+x and variance 2+ x. The expression
corresponds to the standard mean-variance portfolio with the addition of
one-half the variance at the numerator. As shown in Campbell and Viceira
(2002), this term converts from log to simple returns. Here, the expected
log return and variance include a term in x, which embodies ambiguity.
Notice that in our setting any realization of x has two opposite e¤ects.
A low x; for example, carries the good news that volatility is low and at the
same time the bad news that mean returns are low. Whether good news
or bad news prevail depends on the level of : When considering moderate
exposure to risk, that is for  < (2+ )=; the utility of the decision maker
is increasing in x and the worst scenario is a low x: According to (1), then, an
ambiguity averse agent will optimize against the lower measure indexed by
x. Conversely, for positions larger than (2+)=; the utility is decreasing
in x and the ambiguity averse investor optimizes against the distribution
indexed by x.
When  = (2 + )=; the two e¤ects exactly cancel out and the utility
does not depend on x. Hence, in this setting, two portfolios can completely
shield the decision maker from any ambiguity. First, as usual, the one with
no ambiguous asset,  = 0: Second, the portfolio with  = (2 + )=, at
which the trade-o¤ between return and volatility does not depend on the
ambiguity on these parameters. Away from these portfolios, the decision
maker will bear some ambiguity.
We can then express more precisely how the optimal share ?() varies
depending on the excess returns r   rf . Dene the cut-o¤ values
r0 =  1
2
 
2 + x
  x; r1 = 1
2
+
2


2 +

1 +

2

x;
r2 =

1
2
+
2


2 +

1 +

2

x;
where for any given  we have r0  r1  r2: The optimal demand for the
ambiguous assets is
?() =
8>><>>:
0 if r   rf  r0
min(?(x); 1) if r0  r   rf  r1
min(2+ ; 1) if r1  r   rf  r2
min(?(x); 1) if r   rf  r2:
8
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In Figure 8.2, we illustrate the shape of ?() as well as the comparative
statics with respect to ambiguity aversion : The demand of an ambiguity
neutral investor corresponds to the circled line; an increase in  corresponds
to the red dotted curve.
There are four regions to be considered. When excess returns are low,
the optimal demand is exclusively composed of the safe asset and ?() = 0.
The non-participation region increases in ambiguity aversion: The larger
ambiguity aversion, the higher premium an investor requires in order to
invest in the ambiguous asset. This is a well-known e¤ect going back to
Dow and Werlang (1992).
When returns are larger than r0, the demand ?() is positive and de-
pends on the perceived trade-o¤ between risk and returns; that is, on which
as if beliefs the investor uses. For relatively low excess return, the in-
vestor acts as if the process was governed by x, i.e., low mean return and
low volatility. This corresponds to the demand ?(x):
An important observation is that, for a range of returns (strictly) be-
tween r0 and r2, the demand for the risky asset may actually increase in
ambiguity aversion. The reason is that, as mentioned, considering the worst
scenario induces to behave as if volatility was low. Hence, in a sense, am-
biguity aversion induces investors to "underestimate" volatility and that
increases their demand for the risky asset.
The possibility that ambiguity aversion may increase risk taking was al-
ready noticed in Klibano¤ et al. (2005) and Gollier (2011). Our mechanism
however is somewhat distinct and relies on the fact that ambiguity concerns
both mean and variance of returns. We also notice that the region in which
?() is higher for the ambiguity averse agent expands with ambiguity aver-
sion.
The third region, r1  r   rf  r2; corresponds to the case in which
the demand does not vary with the risk premium. This implies a form of
portfolio inertia, in that small shocks to risk premia do not a¤ect investors
demand. Given that as argued a portfolio with  = (2 + )= provides
complete hedging against ambiguity, it takes a large shock to returns to
induce an ambiguity averse investor to change her demand. Notice also that
when  = 0 (ambiguity neutrality), investors display no inertia and, more
generally, the inertia region increases with the degree of ambiguity aversion.
Inertia implies that, for more ambiguity averse investors, portfolios do not
uctuate much in response to shocks.
The possibility of portfolio inertia even at a non-zero ambiguous position
was already shown in Epstein and Schneider (2010) and more generally
in Illeditsch (2011). Related forms of portfolio inertia, driven by lack of
response to news, appear in Garlappi et al. (2007) and Ganguli et al. (2012).
An important observation for our next empirical analysis is that, away
from zero, portfolio inertia does not imply absence of rebalancing. On the
contrary, it may require to continuously rebalance the portfolio so as to
9
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compensate the uctuations induced by the market. Suppose for example
that realized returns of the ambiguous asset exceed risk-free returns; then,
the fraction of wealth invested in ambiguous assets would mechanically in-
crease. If the investor wishes to keep her risk exposure constant, she needs
to reallocate wealth from the ambiguous to the riskless asset.
Finally, in the region where the mean excess return is r   rf  r2, the
investor acts as if the process is governed by x, i.e., high mean return and
high volatility. This leads to the demand ?(x); which decreases with .
We summarize in the following points, which will serve as a guide for the
next empirical analysis.9 According to our model:
(i) Ambiguity aversion increases the non-participation region.
(ii) Conditional on participation, the demand ?() may increase or de-
crease with ambiguity aversion:
(iii) Ambiguity averse investors are more likely to display portfolio inertia
and lower uctuations in their demand.
3 Data
We exploit three sources of data. First, we have obtained administrative
data on portfolio choices from a large French insurance company. These
data describe the value and the detailed composition of clientsholdings of
assurance vie contracts. Despite their name, these are not insurance but
investment products.10
Assurance vie contracts are widespread in France, they are the most
common way through which households invest in the stock market.11 Ac-
cordingly, our sample can be considered broadly representative of French
households. For example, the median total wealth in our sample is between
225 and 300 thousand euros and the median nancial wealth is between 16
and 50 thousands euros. These gures are in line with those obtained for
the general French population (see Arrondel, Borgy and Savignac (2012)).12
9Notice that our model does not incorporate ambiguity lovers. Our qualitative predic-
tions would not be changed by allowing for this possibility.
10The name is due to the fact that, for scal reasons, the contract is formally structured
as an insurance in case of death coupled with an insurance in case of life. A specic feature
of the product is that there is some incentive not to liquidate the contract before some
time (8 years in our sample period) so as to take advantage of reduced taxes on capital
gains.
11According to the French National Institute for Statistics, 41% of French households
held at least one of these contracts in 2010. This makes it the most widespread nancial
product after Livret A, a saving account whose returns are set by the state. See INSEE
Premiere n. 1361 - July 2011 (http://www.insee.fr/fr/¤c/ipweb/ip1361/ip1361.pdf).
12For o¢ cial and comprehensive data, see the 2010 Household
Wealth Survey from the French National Institute for Statistics
10
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A typical assurance vie contract establishes the types of funds in which
the household wishes to invest and the amount of wealth allocated to each
fund. A key distinction is between relatively safe vs. relatively risky funds.
The rst assets, which are called euro funds, are basically bundles of bonds.
Their returns are rather stable and the capital invested is guaranteed by the
company. In the sequel, we will simply refer to those as riskless assets.
The second funds are bundles of stocks, whose returns or capital is not
guaranteed. The client can choose in some details the composition of their
risky assets. In the sequel, we will simply refer to those as risky assets. Over
time, clients are free to change the composition of their portfolios, make new
investment and withdraw money as they wish. There are no restrictions in
the number of contracts each household can have.
Specically, our data record at a monthly frequency the activities in
these contracts from September 2002 to April 2011. The sample includes
511 clients and 1357 contracts.13 These contracts can represent a sizeable
fraction of householdsnancial wealth. In our sample, the average value of
a contract is 16; 900 euros, the maximum is 340; 000 euros.
Our second source of data concerns market returns. As we have detailed
information about the composition of each contract, we can look for the
market returns experienced in a given month by each fund contained in the
contract. We obtain these returns from Thomson Reuters Datastream and,
based on those, we can build the corresponding market returns for each
contract.
Our third source of data is a survey we have designed and conducted
on these same clients. The survey was administered by a professional com-
pany at the end of 2010.14 We have two main purposes. First, we wish to
gather information about demographic characteristics, wealth and portfolio
holdings outside the company. This helps having a broader picture of the
clientsnancial activities.
Second, we wish to have an idea of clients behavioral characteristics,
and in particular of their preferences over risk and ambiguity.15 In the next
section, we describe how we have elicited these preferences.
(http://www.insee.fr/en/methodes/default.asp?page=sources/ope-enquete-
patrimoine.htm).
13 In our sample, 65% of the clients hold more than one contract. The median number
of contracts by client is 2.
14 It was made clear to the subjects that they were contacted as part of a scientic
project on risk, while the insurance company was never mentioned during the interview.
Clients were contacted over the phone and they completed the survey over the internet
while in line with the surveyor.
15The survey also includes a set of questions on preferences over time, expectations and
sophistication, which are however not the main focus of the present paper. We briey
discuss some of them in Section 6.
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4 Risk and Ambiguity Preferences
We elicit preferences over risk in a classical way.16 We ask respondents to
choose between an hypothetical lottery and a sure outcome. Depending on
their answer, we sequentially provide alternative lotteries in which the risky
lottery is made relatively more or less attractive.
Specically, we ask: "You have two options: (a) win 400 euros for sure
vs. (b) win 1000 euros with 50% chance and zero otherwise. Which one
would you choose?" In case (a) is chosen, lottery (a) is replaced by a lottery
which o¤ers 300 euros for sure (while the risky lottery remains the same).
If instead (b) is chosen, lottery (a) is replaced by a lottery which o¤ers
500 euros for sure. We have also asked very similar questions with lotteries
involving losses (see Appendix 8.1 for details).
When lotteries involved gains, 59% of our respondents always chose the
riskless lottery (thereby preferring 300 for sure rather than 1000 with 50%
chance), 19% chose rst the risky and then the riskless lottery, 4% chose
rst the riskless and then the risky lottery, and the remaining 18% always
chose the risky lottery. When lotteries involved losses, the corresponding
proportions were respectively 14%, 23%, 22% and 41%: Consistently with
a large literature, we observe that respondents tend to show higher risk
aversion over gains than over losses. We also observe a positive correlation
between risk aversion over gains and over losses.
These responses can be used to order the respondents in terms of risk
aversion. We build an aggregate measure of risk aversion over gains and over
losses and we dene the dummy Risk Averse as equal to 1 if risk aversion
exceeds the median in the sample.
We follow a similar procedure in order to elicit ambiguity preferences.17
We ask to choose between (a) win 1000 euros with a completely unknown
probability vs. (b) win 1000 euros with 50% chance and zero otherwise. If
(a) is chosen, the risky lottery is replaced by one o¤ering to win 1000 euros
with 60% chance. If instead (b) is chosen, the risky lottery is replaced by
one o¤ering to win 1000 euros with 40% chance. Also in this case, we have
repeated the questions with lotteries involving losses.
When lotteries involved gains, 57% of our respondents always chose the
risky lottery (thereby preferring 1000 with 40% chance rather than with an
16Alternatively, risk preferences may be estimated by revealed preferences from the ob-
served portfolio choices (together with a set of assumptions on utility functions, beliefs,
...). Approaches along these lines include Cohen and Einav (2007); Barseghyan, Molinari,
ODonoghue and Teitelbaum (2013); Barseghyan, Molinari and Teitelbaum (2014) (see
Guiso and Sodini (2012) for a discussion of the various approaches). Exploring the consis-
tency of estimates based on survey vs. those based on revealed preferences is in our view
a very interesting topic for future research.
17Dimmock, Kouwenberg and Wakker (2013) provide a decision theoretic foundation
for this method, showing that ambiguity attitudes can be entirely described by matching
probabilities.
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unknown probability), 14% chose rst the risky and then the ambiguous
lottery, 15% chose rst the ambiguous and then the risky lottery, and the
remaining 14% always chose the ambiguous lottery. When lotteries involved
losses, the corresponding proportions were respectively 37%; 26%, 19%, and
17%: In the same way as for risk, we build an aggregate measure of ambiguity
aversion over gains and over losses, and we dene the dummy Ambiguity
Averse as equal to 1 if ambiguity aversion exceeds the median in the sample.
In Appendix 8.1, we provide a more detailed description of these vari-
ables, as well as of the other variables used in the subsequent analysis. In
Table 1, we report some descriptive statistics. In Table 2, we report the
correlation between our measures of ambiguity aversion, risk aversion and
a set of demographic characteristics. In column (1), Risk Averse appears
negatively related with age and wealth. As for Ambiguity Averse, in column
(2), our demographic characteristics seem to have very little explanatory
power.
In columns (3)-(4), we see that the relation between Ambiguity Averse
and Risk Averse is not very strong and, if anything, it is negative. This is
consistent with the evidence reported in Dimmock, Kouwenberg and Wakker
(2013).18 Importantly for our purposes, this potentially allows us to distin-
guish in our subsequent analysis the e¤ects of ambiguity aversion from that
of risk aversion.
As we have elicited risk preferences in other questions as well, we can
investigate the consistency of our estimates.19 In column (5), we report
the relation between Risk Averse and Job Lottery, in which risk aversion is
elicited as in Barsky, Juster, Kimball and Shapiro (1997). The respondent is
asked to choose between di¤erent jobs: one granting his/her current revenues
forever vs. a riskier job. Depending on the answers, more or less attractive
risky jobs are then sequentially o¤ered. The two measures of risk aversion
are positively related, and the relation is signicant at the 5% level.
In column (6), the variable Certainty Equivalent is based on the will-
ingness to pay for a lottery in which a coin is tossed 100 times and 1 euro
is obtained each time head occurs (similarly to Mansour, Jouini and Napp
(2006)). The relation with Risk Averse is negative as one would expect,
even though only marginally signicant.
Overall, the various measures give a consistent picture, which is reassur-
ing on the validity of our methods for eliciting risk preferences.20 We can
18The evidence on the relation between risk and ambiguity preference is not abundant,
and it does not give a clear picture. Butler, Guiso and Jappelli (2012) document instead
a positive relation between the two.
19We have no other quantitative questions eliciting ambiguity preferences.
20 Indeed, our results would not be qualitatively di¤erent if we used these alternative
measures of risk aversion. We emphasize the variable Risk Averse because it involves risk
preferences both over gains and over losses, and because its framing is similar to the one
on ambiguity preferences.
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then turn to our main purpose of investigating whether these measures have
any predictive power on real life portfolio choices.
5 Empirical Analysis
We divide our empirical investigation into three parts. First, we study static
portfolio choices. Then, we look at how households rebalance their contracts
over time. Last, we study the performance of their portfolios. We will study
when and how ambiguity aversion plays a role, in particular compared to
risk aversion, in these three important dimensions of portfolio choice.
5.1 Static Portfolio Choices
We start by considering the propensity to hold a risky portfolio; then, we
focus on risky contracts and consider the value of risky assets as a fraction of
the total portfolio. Holding a risky portfolio may be related to households
participation in the stock market. As mentioned, starting from Dow and
Werlang (1992), it has been shown theoretically that ambiguity aversion
may induce households to refrain from investing in stocks.
The value of risky assets as a fraction of the total portfolio is instead a
way to account for householdsexposure to risk. The measure is simple (and
probably most salient to decision makers) and, as in Calvet et al. (2007),
it is highly correlated with the actual risk experienced in the portfolio (as
measured by the standard deviation or the beta of the returns). Moreover,
as suggested in Section 2, the e¤ect of risk vs. ambiguity preferences may
be particularly interesting here: While risk aversion should clearly reduce
risk taking, the relation with ambiguity aversion is less clear-cut.
Our investigation starts by estimating the following equation:
i;c;t = + 1ambigi + 2riski +X
0
i + t + "i;c;t: (3)
In equation (3), i;c;t denotes the choice of individual i on contract c at
time t, X
0
i includes a set of standard demographic variables (age, gender,
education, marital status, income, wealth) and t are month-year xed-
e¤ects. Our coe¢ cient of interest are 1 and 2; which describe respectively
the impact of ambiguity and risk preferences, as elicited in our survey, on the
portfolio choice. As the choices of a given individual may be correlated across
contracts as well as over time, we cluster standard errors at the individual
level.21
We rst report our results on the likelihood to hold risky portfolios.22
21We have also performed our regressions by clustering both at the time and at the
individual level, using a method suggested by Petersen (2009). Results are not changed.
22For simplicity, throughout the paper, we report results based on OLS estimates. Re-
sults do not change if, for categorical or censored variables, we employ probit or tobit
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In our sample, on average 42% of the contracts contain some risky asset.
According to our model and to the literature quoted above, this fraction
should decrease both with risk and with ambiguity aversion. In columns (1)-
(3) of Table 3, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the contract
contains some risky asset. It appears that ambiguity aversion decreases the
propensity to hold a risky contract, but standard errors are large. The e¤ect
of risk aversion too is negative but not signicant.
These results are not conclusive. As mentioned, this appears to be the
case also in Dimmock, Kouwenberg and Wakker (2013), who report no sig-
nicant relation between ambiguity aversion and stock market participation
on Dutch households. On the other hand, Dimmock, Kouwenberg, Mitchell
and Peijnenburg (2013) nd a negative and signicant relation in the Amer-
ican Life Panel data. We also notice that, while holding risky assurance
vie contracts is a form of participation in the stock market, our evidence
on participation is only partial as we lack a detailed picture of households
entire portfolios. Finally, participation in the stock market via assurance
vie contracts is quite widespread (much more than participation via direct
stock holdings). In our sample, 75% of clients hold a risky contract at some
point in time. This may limit the variation observed across households and
so partly explain low statistical power.
We then turn to the e¤ects of ambiguity and risk preferences on the risky
share. In columns (4)-(6), the sample is restricted to risky contracts and the
dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the value of the risky assets
over the total value of the contract exceeds the median in the sample (that
is equal to 0:51). The e¤ect of risk aversion does not appear statistically
signicant. On the other hand, ambiguity aversion is strongly related to risk
taking, and the relation is positive. Ambiguity averse individuals are 11%
more likely to hold a contract with a large risk exposure (where "large" is
dened relative to the median in the sample).
In Table 4, we check whether this relation is robust to alternative mea-
sures of risk taking. In columns (1)-(2), we show that ambiguity averse in-
dividuals hold contracts with a 7% higher share of wealth invested in risky
assets (relative to an average share of 56%). A similar picture obtains as
we measure risk taking by the standard deviation of the returns (columns
3-4) and by the beta of the portfolio (column 5-6).23 Moreover, unreported
results show that the coe¢ cients are not a¤ected by the inclusion (or exclu-
sion) of the various controls. Overall, the result appears robust: Conditional
on holding risky assets, ambiguity averse individuals tend to take more risk.
models.
23The variable Std Dev refers to the standard deviation of the returns in the previous
12 months. The variable Beta is a measure of systematic risk constructed by regressing
portfolio returns in the previous 12 months on the French stock market index CAC40.
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While somewhat surprising, this result can be accounted for by the model
of Section 2 in which the share of the ambiguity asset might increase with
ambiguity aversion. This occurs when the worst scenariois the low mean,
low variance conguration. The corresponding prior therefore tends to un-
derestimatethe variance relative to the ambiguity neutral prior, which may
lead the investor to take more risk. More generally, these results are clearly
suggestive that risk and ambiguity preferences need not a¤ect choices in the
same way and may actually push in opposite directions.
5.2 Dynamic Portfolio Choices
A distinctive feature of our database is its panel dimension: we observe
clientsbehavior at a monthly frequency for about 8 years. This allows us to
explore how investors change their exposure to risk over time, and so to relate
to a recent literature on dynamic portfolio choices under ambiguity aversion.
In particular, we can investigate whether ambiguity averse investors exhibit
some form of portfolio inertia.
In our model, as in Epstein and Schneider (2010) and more generally
in Illeditsch (2011), inertia may occur also when households have a positive
exposure to risk, if they have chosen their exposure so as to hedge against
ambiguity. In this case, they wish to keep it constant even after (small)
shocks to expected returns or perceived uncertainty. Garlappi et al. (2007)
ad Ganguli et al. (2012) also show that ambiguity averse investors may not
change much their portfolio weights as they tend to ignore news about future
returns. Portfolio inertia impacts the amount of information revealed in
prices and ultimately their level and volatility (Condie and Ganguli (2012)).
We now consider how householdsexposure to risk, as measured by the
share of risky assets in their portfolios, evolves over time. Following Calvet
et al. (2009), we distinguish passive and active changes in risk exposure.
The rst is driven by di¤erential market returns of risky vs. riskless assets:
if the former outperform the latter, the risky share tends to increase (and
vice-versa). On top of this, investors may change their risk exposure by
actively rebalancing their portfolios or investing/withdrawing money from
the various assets.
Specically, keeping the notation of Section 2, suppose that R^   Rf is
the realized excess return of the risky asset between t 1 and t: The passive
share is dened as
Pt =
(1 + R^)t 1
1 +Rf + (R^ Rf )t 1
: (4)
If we observe that the risky share moves from t 1 to t; we dene the passive
change as
PCt = 
P
t   t 1; (5)
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and the active change as
ACt = t   Pt : (6)
If t 1 2 (0; 1); we can look at the sign of the ratio ACt=PCt. A posi-
tive ratio indicates that an investor is rebalancing his contract in the same
direction as the market; that is, he is investing relatively more in assets
which have performed better in the past. We say he acts as a chaser. A
negative ratio instead indicates that an investor is rebalancing his portfolio
contrary to the market, and we refer to him as contrarian. Notice that a
special case of contrarian behavior is dened by those individuals who wish
to keep their risky share constant over time, and they continuously rebal-
ance their portfolio accordingly. For those individuals, we should observe
that ACt=PCt =  1:
Of course, individuals may remain inactive. On average, 64% of the
contracts show zero active change in a given month. Restricting to risky
contracts, the average is 21%. These gures provide a lower bound on the
fraction of contracts for which there is no active rebalancing in a given
month.24
We rst consider how ambiguity and risk preferences a¤ect the magni-
tude of the changes in risk exposure over time. In column (1) of Table 5,
the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the total change in the
risk prole jt   t 1j exceeds in absolute value the median in the sample
(that is equal to zero). In column (2), we look at relative changes in risk
prole, that is j(t   t 1)=t 1j and so we restrict the sample to contracts
with t 1 > 0. We construct a dummy equal to one if the relative change in
the risk prole exceeds in absolute value the median in the sample (that is
equal to 0:96%).
In both columns, it appears that ambiguity aversion leads to more stable
risky shares over time. More precisely, contracts held by ambiguity averse
individuals are 7% less likely to experience large uctuations from one month
to the next, where "large" is dened relative to the median in the sample.
The e¤ect of risk aversion is negative but not signicant.
In columns (3)-(4), we focus on active changes. In column (3), the de-
pendent variable is a dummy equal to one if the active change in the risk
prole
t   Pt  exceeds in absolute value the median in the sample (that
is equal to zero). In column (4), the dependent variable is a dummy equal
to one if the relative active change
(t   Pt )=Pt  exceeds in absolute value
the median in the sample (that is equal to 0:56%). Consistently with the
previous results, we see that ambiguity averse individuals are less likely to
actively induce large uctuations in their risk exposure.
We then investigate in more details the direction of rebalancing. In
24These are lower bounds since values of active change close to zero may not be due to
small rebalancing but just to measurement error (e.g. driven by rounding o¤ the passive
share).
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Table 6, the dependent variable is chaser, that is a dummy equal to one if
ACt=PCt > 0 and to zero if ACt=PCt < 0: From columns (1)-(3), we see
that ambiguity averse individuals are about 2% less likely to chase returns
(relative to an average of 43%). The e¤ect of risk aversion is not signicant.
Portfolio rebalancing depends also on beliefs about future returns, which
in turn may be a¤ected by observed returns. Hurd, Van Rooij and Winter
(2011) show that recent stock market increases tend to raise the expectation
about future market returns. Similarly, Vissing-Jorgensen (2004) documents
how households change their expectations in response to their own past
returns. Accordingly, we check the robustness of our results to the inclusion
of controls on market experiences such as past portfolio returns.25 This is
also a way to compare the magnitude of the e¤ects of ambiguity aversion (a
behavioral trait) with those of market experiences.
Specically, in column (4), we include a measure of global market trends
(instead of time xed e¤ects). The variable Good Times is a dummy equal
to one if the average monthly returns observed in a given month exceed the
median returns in our sample (equal to 0:44%). The estimate shows that,
in good times investors are 3% more likely to chase returns. The coe¢ cient
on ambiguity aversion is not a¤ected.
In column (5), the variable Overperform is a dummy equal to one if the
returns of the contract between t 1 and t exceed the median market returns
in that month. Individuals who have performed well relative to the market
are 4% more likely to chase returns, and again the coe¢ cient on ambiguity
aversion remains unchanged.
In columns (6), we consider whether a given contract is experiencing a
better trend than the median contract. Specically, the variable Improve
is a dummy equal to one if the di¤erence between current and past returns
exceeds the market median di¤erence in the same period. The e¤ect is
positive and bigger than the previous e¤ects: Individuals who experience
better trends are 14% more likely to act as chaser.
In magnitude, the e¤ect of ambiguity aversion appears smaller than the
one of market experiences. Still, the estimates are signicant and robust
across specications. Ambiguity averse investors are less likely to chase
returns. This is consistent with our model in that their demand for the
risky asset may be at, so small uctuations in risk premia need not generate
any change in the demand of these investors. This is also consistent with
the evidence of Table 5 whereby ambiguity averse investors show relatively
stable risky shares over time.
25Moreover, in Section 6, we consider other behavioral traits which may a¤ect stock
market expectations.
18
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.65
5.3 Performance
We now turn to the relation between ambiguity preferences and portfolio
returns. Some scholars have proposed models in which ambiguity aver-
sion leads to under diversication, that is to a portfolio which is biased to-
wards less ambiguous assets (relative to standard mean-variance portfolio).26
Based on these insights, one may expect that ambiguity averse investors ex-
perience lower performances in their contracts. On the other hand, Garlappi
et al. (2007) have shown that ambiguity averse investors (who are less sensi-
tive to information about expected returns) may earn higher out-of-sample
Sharpe Ratios when expected returns are di¢ cult to predict.
This debate is also relevant for the literature on the long run survival of
ambiguity averse investors and so on their aggregate impact on asset prices.
Condie (2008) shows that, in markets with aggregate risk and rational utility
maximizers, ambiguity averse investors should not be expected to survive.
Guerdijkova and Sciubba (2012) provide a model in which ambiguity averse
investors may survive despite their distorted beliefs as ambiguity aversion
may act as an extra discount factor and so increase the propensity to save.
We start by considering the entire sample of contracts. In Table 7, the
dependent variable is the monthly return (in percentage points) experienced
in a given contract. The average monthly return in the overall sample is
0:36%. Restricting to risky contracts, the average is 0:39%. In column (1),
it appears that ambiguity averse individuals experience higher raw returns
and risk averse individuals experience lower raw returns. This may just
reect the evidence presented earlier that ambiguity averse individuals tend
to take more risk while risk averse individuals tend to take less risk.
To shed further light on this possibility, in columns (2)-(4), we control
for various measures of risk: the risky share of the contract, the standard
deviation of the returns, the beta of the returns. As expected, all these
measures have a positive and signicant impact on returns. The estimated
impact of ambiguity aversion, however, does not change much. Overall, am-
biguity averse investors experience about 0:014% higher returns per month
(that is, about 0:18% per year). The e¤ect of risk aversion is negative and
slightly bigger in magnitude.
In columns (5)-(6), we investigate whether these di¤erences in returns
are heterogeneous with respect to the overall market returns. The dummy
Good Times is the one introduced in the previous section, and we study its
interaction with ambiguity and risk preferences. In column (5), the variable
replaces time xed e¤ects. In column (6), time xed e¤ects are included
instead. Ambiguity averse investors seem to experience relatively higher re-
26See Uppal and Wang (2003) for a model in which investors allocate their wealth
between several assets whose returns are perceived to be more or less ambiguous. Similar
insights have been proposed on the relation between ambiguity aversion and home bias
(e.g. Boyle et al. (2012)).
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turns in good times, while risk averse investors seem to experience relatively
lower returns in good times, but estimates are not signicant.
We further investigate the determinants of these di¤erences by focusing
on those contracts which contain some risky assets. Results are presented
in Table 8, which follows the same structure as Table 7. We rst notice
that results are larger in magnitude, as one would expect given that the
variation in returns in a given month comes from risky contracts. As shown
in columns (1)-(4), the positive impact of ambiguity aversion is driven by
those contracts which contain risky assets. In these contracts, ambiguity
averse investors experience about 0:035% higher returns per month (that is,
about 0:51% per year). The e¤ect of risk aversion is negative and of similar
magnitude.
As in Table 7, we then look at heterogeneous impacts with respect to
Good Times. Estimates in column (6) show that ambiguity aversion leads to
0:2% higher returns in good times and to 0:13% lower returns in bad times.
That is the case even when controlling for the riskiness of the contract.27
These results are perhaps surprising in light of the theoretical literature
mentioned above on under diversication, which would predict lower (risk-
adjusted) returns. They are however consistent with the evidence we have
presented earlier that ambiguity averse investors tend to choose riskier con-
tracts, and in particular to hold portfolios with a higher beta. Overall, their
returns are higher, but at the same time they are more sensitive to market
trends.
6 Discussion
In this section, we wish to address two issues. First, whether our results
may be biased by omitted behavioral characteristics. Second, whether our
results can be considered representative of householdsnancial behaviors
in their broader portfolio.
6.1 Alternative behavioral traits
In principle, our previous estimates may be driven by factors correlated
with ambiguity aversion and omitted from our regressions. This is of course
a di¢ cult issue to resolve completely without experimental data. A rst
partial response is to notice that estimates do not seem sensitive to the
inclusion or exclusion of various controls. This is what one would expect
given that, as shown in Table 2, ambiguity aversion does not correlate much
with standard demographic variables.
27We only report the results in which we control for the standard deviation of the
returns. Controlling for the risky share or for beta does not change our coe¢ cients of
interest.
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On the other hand, ambiguity preferences may be related to other be-
havioral traits which we have not considered in our main analysis. First,
ambiguity aversion may be related to sophistication: Halevy (2007) shows
that probabilistically sophisticated subjects tend to be neutral towards am-
biguity; Chew, Ratchford and Sagi (2013) show that only sophisticated sub-
jects react to ambiguity as less sophisticated subjects fail to perceive its
mere presence. Second, ambiguity aversion may be related to (lack of) con-
dence. Heath and Tversky (1991) and Fox and Tversky (1995) show that
ambiguity aversion may stem from the perceived lack of knowledge about
the context. Third, in the spirit of Halevy (2008), ambiguity may be related
to present biased preferences (see Cohen, Tallon and Vergnaud (2011) for
an empirical investigation).
In order to dig further in this direction, we build some measures of so-
phistication, condence, and time preference based on our survey questions.
As for sophistication, we exploit a question in which we asked to compute
compound interests. Assuming that one invested 1000 euros at a rate of 2%
per year, subjects were asked how much money would be available after one
year and after ve years. The variable Compute Interest is a dummy equal
to 1 if the respondent answered correctly (see Appendix 8.1 for details).
As for condence, we have asked a series of 10 true/false questions in-
cluding whether holding shares gives the right to a xed revenue; whether
the value of the CAC40 Index has increased during 2009; whether the UK is
part of the Euro area (the complete list and the exact formulation is reported
in Appendix 8.1). Then, we have asked respondents how many questions
they thought they answered correctly. Our measure of condence is based
on the di¤erence between the subjective estimate and the actual number of
correct answers. We construct the dummy Condence which is equal to one
if the subject displays a level of condence above the median in the sample
(that is equal to zero).
Finally, we capture present biased preferences by asking subjects to
choose (hypothetically) between smaller gains today vs. larger gains in one
month, and then between the same gains in 12 vs. 13 months. The variable
Hyperbolic is a dummy equal to 1 if the subject prefers smaller gains today
but higher gains when both alternatives are delayed.
While investigating the e¤ects of all these traits on portfolio choices re-
mains beyond the scope of the present analysis, we here address the more
limited issue of whether our coe¢ cients of interest are a¤ected by the inclu-
sion of these extra variables. Results appear in Table 9, in which we re-run
the main regressions of Section 5 adding the additional behavioral traits as
controls. In column 1, the dependent variable captures the propensity to
hold a risky contract (as in Table 3, column 3). In column 2, we look at the
fraction of wealth invested in risky assets conditional on risk taking (as in
Table 3, column 6); in column 3, we consider the change in risk exposure
over time (as in Table 5, column 1); in column 4, we look at the direction
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of rebalancing (as in Table 6, column 3). Finally, as in Tables 7 and 8, we
consider monthly returns both overall (column 5) and conditional on risk
taking (column 6).
The additional behavioral traits seem to explain little of the observed
portfolio choices, and results are basically unchanged relative to the baseline
specications in Section 5.28 The e¤ects of ambiguity aversion are robust to
the inclusion of our measures of sophistication, condence, and time prefer-
ences.
6.2 Representativeness
As stressed, our results are based on the behavior observed within the com-
pany and, as in most studies employing administrative data, we lack a full
picture of householdsportfolio or even more generally of their exposure to
risk in other dimensions. One may then question whether what we observe
within the company should be considered representative of householdsbe-
haviors in their overall portfolios.
As a step towards answering this question, we exploit the information
collected in our survey on householdsnancial assets and total wealth. We
can estimate the fraction of wealth that the household has invested in the
company, and check whether the e¤ects of ambiguity and risk preferences
are di¤erent for those who have invested a lot vs. little of their wealth. If
our estimates were driven by those with low investment in the company, our
previous results may not be considered as very representative.29
In our survey, respondents were asked to report the value of their total
wealth within a range. In order to dene the fraction of wealth invested, we
need to build a point estimate. We consider the midpoint in each interval,
except for the highest interval (where clients report wealth of 1 million euros
or above) where we consider the minimum of the interval.30 In a similar
way, we construct point estimates for the value of nancial assets. We then
compare these gures to the value of the contracts held in the company as of
August 2010 (around the time when the survey was conducted). According
to these estimates, the median client holds 37% of his nancial assets and
6% of his total wealth in the company. For each client, we then dene the
dummy Low Invest as being equal to one if the value of his contracts is lower
than 6% of his total wealth.31 In particular, we are interested in exploring
28Similar results obtain by including the additional behavioral traits one by one.
29Alternatively, one may invoke a form narrow framing whereby each asset (here, an
assurance vie contract) is treated by households in isolation from the rest of their portfolio.
For evidence of narrow framing, see e.g. Kahneman and Lovallo (1993), Barberis, Huang
and Thaler (2006) and Choi, Laibson and Madrian (2009).
30We have also considered the minimum or the maximum in the interval and the fol-
lowing results are not a¤ected.
31Similar results would obtain by constructing the dummy based on the value of the
contracts relative to the clients nancial assets as well as by using the value of contracts
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the interaction between Low Invest and ambiguity preferences.
Results are reported in Table 10. The coe¢ cient on Ambig Averse de-
scribes the e¤ect of ambiguity aversion on those clients who have a large
fraction of their wealth invested in the company. The coe¢ cient on Low In-
vest*Ambig describes the di¤erential impact of ambiguity aversion on those
with a small fraction of wealth invested in the company. Similarly, for the
coe¢ cients on Risk Averse.
As in Table 9, the dependent variables relate to the main results of the
previous analysis. That is, we keep the same specications as in Section 5
and investigate the e¤ects on the propensity to hold a risky contract (column
1), the fraction of wealth invested in risky assets (column 2), the change in
risk exposure over time (column 3), the direction of rebalancing (column 4)
and the monthly returns both overall (column 5) and conditional on risk
taking (column 6).
In column 1, we observe that ambiguity averse clients with a large frac-
tion of wealth invested are less likely to hold risky contracts while the op-
posite is true for those with low wealth invested. However, as in the main
analysis (Table 3, column 3), estimates are not statistically di¤erent from
zero.
In columns (2)-(6), we see that our main results hold in the subsample
of investors with a large fraction of wealth in the company, and that the
e¤ects of ambiguity aversion are not signicantly di¤erent for those with
a low fraction invested. Moreover, in magnitude, the estimated e¤ects on
those with large investments are slightly bigger than the estimates obtained
on the entire sample.
Overall, the e¤ects of ambiguity aversion do not seem to vary substan-
tially depending on the fraction of wealth invested in the company. If any-
thing, results are sometimes stronger on clients with large investments, for
which arguably the observed portfolio is more representative of the overall
portfolio. This suggests that the behaviors we observe within the company
are (broadly) consistent with the behaviors of the households in their global
portfolio.
7 Conclusion
We have explored the empirical relation between ambiguity aversion, risk
aversion and portfolio choices. For this purpose, we have exploited an origi-
nal data set in which administrative panel data obtained from a large French
company are matched with survey data on preferences over ambiguity and
risk. We have investigated in particular how these preferences a¤ect house-
holds choices in terms of risk exposure, portfolio rebalancing as well as
in months nearby August 2010.
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the performance of their assets. We have shown that, conditional on par-
ticipation, ambiguity averse individuals tend to choose riskier contracts.
Moreover, they are more likely to rebalance their portfolio in a contrarian
direction relative to the market. Accordingly, their exposure to risk is more
stable over time. Finally, we have shown that ambiguity averse individuals
experience higher market returns in good times and lower returns in bad
times. The e¤ects of risk aversion are often very di¤erent both in sign and
in magnitude.
As detailed above, some of these results lend support to existing theories
of ambiguity aversion and portfolio choices. Other results, like increased risk
taking and volatility of returns, are at rst sight puzzling and we hope they
can motivate further investigations. Both from a theoretical viewpoint, so as
to better uncover the underlying mechanisms, and from an empirical view-
point, so as to test their validity in other settings. This is only a rst step
towards an understanding of the empirical content of ambiguity preferences
and of their relation with risk preferences. In our view, more research along
these lines is clearly desirable.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Description of variables
Risk Averse
The variable is based on the following questions: "You have two options:
(a) win 400 euros for sure vs. (b) win 1000 euros with 50% chance and
zero otherwise. Which one would you choose?" In case (a) is chosen, we
then o¤er the choice between (c) win 300 euros for sure vs. (d) win 1000
euros with 50% chance and zero otherwise. In case (b) is chosen, we instead
o¤er the choice between (e) win 500 euros for sure vs. (f) win 1000 euros
with 50% chance and zero otherwise. We build the variable risk gains which
takes values 4 if (a) and (c) are chosen, 3 if (a) and (d) are chosen, 2 if (b)
and (e) are chosen, and 1 if (b) and (f) are chosen.
As for risk aversion over losses, we ask: "You have two options: (a)
lose 400 euros for sure vs. (b) lose 1000 euros with 50% chance and zero
otherwise. Which one would you choose?" Similarly to above, in case (a) is
chosen, we o¤er the choice between (c) lose 500 euros for sure vs. (d) lose
1000 euros with 50% chance and zero otherwise. In case (b) is chosen, we the
choice between (e) lose 300 euros for sure vs. (f) lose 1000 euros with 50%
chance and zero otherwise. We build the variable risk losses which takes
values 4 if (a) and (c) are chosen, 3 if (a) and (d) are chosen, 2 if (b) and
(e) are chosen, and 1 if (b) and (f) are chosen. We then sum risk gains and
risk losses and so obtain a 2 to 8 variable risk aversion. The dummy Risk
Averse equals 1 if risk aversion exceeds the median in the sample (equal to
5).
Ambig Averse
The variable is based on the following questions: "You have two options:
(a) win 1000 euros with a completely unknown probability vs. (b) win 1000
euros with 50% chance and zero otherwise. Which one would you choose?"
If (a) is chosen, we propose (c) win 1000 euros with a completely unknown
probability vs. (d) win 1000 euros with 60% chance and zero otherwise. If
(b) is chosen, we propose (e) win 1000 euros with a completely unknown
probability vs. (f) win 1000 euros with 40% chance and zero otherwise. We
build the variable ambig gains which takes values 1 if (a) and (c) are chosen,
2 if (a) and (d) are chosen, 3 if (b) and (e) are chosen, and 4 if (b) and (f)
are chosen.
As for losses, we ask to choose between (a) lose 1000 euros with a com-
pletely unknown probability vs. (b) lose 1000 euros with 50% chance and
zero otherwise. If (a) is chosen, we propose (c) lose 1000 euros with a com-
pletely unknown probability vs. (d) lose 1000 euros with 40% chance and
zero otherwise. If (b) is chosen, we propose (e) lose 1000 euros with a com-
pletely unknown probability vs. (f) lose 1000 euros with 60% chance and
zero otherwise. We build the variable ambig losses which takes values 1 if
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(a) and (c) are chosen, 2 if (a) and (d) are chosen, 3 if (b) and (e) are chosen,
and 4 if (b) and (f) are chosen. We obtain ambiguity aversion as the sum
of ambig gains and ambig losses and we dene Ambig Averse as equal to 1
if ambiguity aversion exceeds the median in the sample (equal to 6).
Averse Job Lottery
The variable is based on the following questions: "Suppose you are the
only member of your family which gains money. Given your health problems,
your doctor has recommended that you move. You can choose between two
jobs: Job (s) guarantees your current revenues forever. Job (a) o¤ers a
50% probability of doubling your revenues forever and a 50% probability of
diminishing them by 1=3. Which one would you choose?" If (s) is chosen,
job (a) is replaced by job (b), which o¤ers a 50% probability of doubling
your revenues forever and a 50% probability of diminishing them by 20%. If
(a) is chosen, job (a) is replaced by job (c), which o¤ers a 50% probability of
doubling your revenues forever and a 50% probability of diminishing them
by 20%. If (s) is chosen again in the second question, job (b) is replaced by
job (d), which o¤ers a 50% probability of doubling your revenues forever and
a 50% probability of diminishing them by 10%. If (c) is chosen in the second
question, job (c) is replaced by job (e), which o¤ers a 50% probability of
doubling your revenues forever and a 50% probability of diminishing them
by 75%. The variable job lottery equals 6 if (s)(s)(s) is chosen, 5 if (s)(s)(d)
is chosen, 4 if (s)(b) is chosen , 3 if (a)(s) is chosen, 2 if (a)(c)(s) is chosen, 1
if (a)(c)(e) is chosen. The dummy Averse Job Lottery equals 1 if job lottery
exceeds the median in the sample (equal to 4).
Certainty Equivalent
The variable is based on the following question: "A coin is tossed 100
times and you win 1 euro each time head occurs. How much would you be
willing to pay to play this game?" The dummy Certainty Equivalent equals
1 if the willingness to pay exceeds the median in the sample (equal to 10).
Education
The variable takes value 1 if no formal education is reported, 2 refers to
vocational training, 3 refers to baccalaureat, 4 refers to a 2-years post bac
diploma, 5 refers to a 3-years post bac diploma, 6 refers to a 4-years post
bac diploma, 7 refers to a 5-years post bac diploma or above.
Age
The variable takes value 1 if the respondent is less than 30 years old, 2
refers to between 30 and 44 years old, 3 refers to between 45 and 64 years
old, 4 refers to 65 years or older.
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Income
Monthly net revenues of the household (in euros). A value of 1 corre-
sponds to less than 1000, 2 indicates between 1000 and 1499, 3 indicates
between 1500 and 1999, 4 indicates between 2000 and 2999, 5 indicates be-
tween 3000 and 4999, 6 indicates 5000 and 6999, 7 indicates between 7000
and 9999, 8 indicates over 10000.
Total Wealth
Total wealth of the household (in euros). A value of 1 corresponds to less
than 8000, 2 indicates between 8000 and 14999, 3 indicates between 15000
and 39999, 4 indicates between 40000 and 79999, 5 indicates between 80000
and 149999, 6 indicates 150000 and 224999, 7 indicates between 225000 and
299999, 8 indicates between 300000 and 449999, 9 indicates between 450000
and 749999, 10 indicates between 750000 and 999999, 11 indicates over 1
million.
Financial Assets
Financial assets of the household (excluding housing and business). A
value of 1 corresponds to less than 1600, 2 indicates between 1600 and
3999, 3 indicates between 4000 and 8999, 4 indicates between 9000 and
15999, 5 indicates between 16000 and 49999, 6 indicates 50000 and 79999, 7
indicates between 80000 and 159999, 8 indicates between 160000 and 259999,
9 indicates between 260000 and 549999, 10 indicates between 550000 and
999999, 11 indicates over 1 million.
Compute Interest
The variable is based on the following questions: "Suppose that you have
1000 e in a saving account which o¤ers a return of 2% per year. After one
year, assuming that you have not touched your initial deposit, how much
would you own? 1) Less than 1020 e; 2) Exactly 1020 e; 3) More than
1020 e; 4) I dont know." "After ve years, assuming that you have not
touched your initial deposit, how much would you own? 1) Less than 1100
e; 2) Exactly 1100 e; 3) More than 1100 e; 4) I dont know." The variable
Compute Interest is a dummy equal to 1 if the subject answered "Exactly
1020 e" to the rst question and "More than 1100 e" to the second question,
and equal to zero otherwise.
Condence
The variable is based on the following questions: "We will give you
a series of statements. For them, please say whether it is true or false.
Please answer quickly. 1) Livret A are used to nance social housing; 2)
In 2008, the value of the CAC 40 Index of the largest listed companies has
decreased by more than 50%; 3) Etna is in Sardinia; 4) In France, revenues
from income taxes exceeds those on the VAT; 5) The French Constitution
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includes a declaration for the environment; 6) UK is part of the Euro area;
7) The value of the CAC 40 Index has increased during 2009; 8) A share
gives the right to a xed revenue; 9) Assurance Vie contracts benet from a
special scal treatment; 10) 40 divided by one half, plus 10 equals 30."
We dene the variable Actual based on the number of correct answers:
1) Less than 3; 2) 3 or 4; 3) 5 or 6; 4) 7 or 8 ; 5) 9 or more. We dene
the variable Subjective based on the following question: "On the previous
10 questions, how many correct answers do you think you have given? 1)
Less than 3; 2) 3 or 4; 3) 5 or 6; 4) 7 or 8 ; 5) 9 or more". Our measure of
condence is based on the di¤erence between Subjective and Actual correct
answers. In particular, Condence is a dummy equal to one if the di¤erence
is equal to zero (which is the median in the sample) or above; and equal to
zero if the di¤erence between Subjective and Actual is negative.
Hyperbolic
The variable is based on the following questions: "You can choose be-
tween 1) 1000 euros now; 2) 1020 euros in a month. Which one would you
choose?" and "You can choose between 1) 1000 euros in 12 months; 2) 1020
euros in 13 months. Which one would you choose?" The variable Hyper-
bolic is a dummy equal to 1 if 1) was chosen in the rst question and 2) was
chosen in the second question, and to zero otherwise.
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Figure 1:
This gure plots the ambiguous share as a function of the premium and
shows some comparative statics with respect to ambiguity aversion. The
red dotted line corresponds to higher ambiguity aversion. The blue circles
correspond to ambiguity neutrality.
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8.3 Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Risk Averse 511 0.3836 0.4867 0 1
Ambig Averse 511 0.3894 0.4881 0 1
Education 501 4.4212 1.8858 1 7
Married 511 0.7632 0.4255 0 1
Age 511 2.6125 0.7531 1 4
Female 511 0.4716 0.4997 0 1
Income 494 4.5324 1.5530 1 8
Total Wealth 469 6.8849 2.4668 1 11
Financial Assets 476 4.8403 2.4034 1 11
Stock Holding 498 0.2691 0.4439 0 1
Averse Job Lottery 511 0.5969 0.4910 0 1
Certainty Equivalent 507 0.5720 0.4953 0 1
Low Invest 459 0.5272 0.4998 0 1
Compute Interest 511 0.5342 0.4993 0 1
Condence 511 0.5362 0.4992 0 1
Hyperbolic 511 0.1957 0.3971 0 1
Risky Contract 111697 0.4186 0.4933 0 1
High Risk 46760 0.5000 0.5000 0 1
Risky Share 46760 0.5632 0.3003 0.0001 1
Std Dev 112630 0.0094 0.0102 0 0.0396
Beta 112635 0.0877 0.1825 -0.1265 1.1801
Chaser 36655 0.4270 0.4946 0 1
Total Change Absolute 109801 0.3463 0.4758 0 1
Total Change Relative 45900 0.4508 0.4976 0 1
Active Change Absolute 109801 0.3345 0.4718 0 1
Active Change Relative 44656 0.4288 0.4949 0 1
Monthly Returns (in %) 112635 0.3610 0.9693 -8.8125 7.3912
Good Times 111847 0.5014 0.5000 0 1
Overperform 86890 0.4928 0.5000 0 1
Improve 87003 0.5154 0.4998 0 1
Note: The table reports summary statistics for all variables used in the
regressions. A denition of these variables can be found in the text and in
Appendix 8.1.
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Table 2: Ambiguity and Risk Preferences
Dep Variable Risk Averse Ambig Averse Risk Averse
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Averse Job Lottery 0.104
(0.048)**
Certainty Equivalent -0.077
(0.046)*
Risk Averse -0.085 -0.073
(0.044)* (0.048)
Education -0.001 -0.023 -0.023 0.001 -0.001
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Married 0.06 -0.047 -0.043 0.058 0.05
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.058) (0.059)
Age -0.086 -0.007 -0.014 -0.098 -0.091
(0.034)** (0.035) (0.035) (0.034)*** (0.034)***
Female -0.015 -0.016 -0.017 -0.021 -0.02
(0.047) (0.049) (0.049) (0.047) (0.047)
Income -0.005 0.031 0.031 -0.005 -0.003
(0.021) (0.021) (0.02) (0.021) (0.02)
Total Wealth -0.023 0.014 0.012 -002 -0.022
(0.012)* (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)* (0.012)*
Financial Assets 0.0004 0.004 0.004 0.004 -0.001
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
Observations 452 452 511 452 452 450
R-squared 0.044 0.017 0.007 0.022 0.054 0.05
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions. A detailed description of all the
variables appears in Appendix 8.1. Robust standard errors are in brackets. ,  and 
denotes signicance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3: Participation and Risk Taking
Dep Variable Risky Contract High Risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ambig Averse -0.011 -0.018 0.112 0.115
(0.043) (0.043) (0.040)*** (0.040)***
Risk Averse -0.045 -0.047 0.018 0.029
(0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.041)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 77700 77700 77700 35634 35634 35634
Number of Clusters 451 451 451 310 310 310
R-squared 0.05 0.048 0.05 0.113 0.102 0.114
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions. In columns 1-3, the dependent
variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the contract contains some risky asset. In columns
4-6, the sample includes only risky contracts and the dependent variable is a dummy
equal to 1 if the value of the risky assets over the total value of the contract exceeds the
median in the sample (that is equal to 0.51). Controls include age, gender, education,
marital status, income, nancial assets and total wealth. Robust standard errors,
clustered at the individual level, are in brackets. ,  and  denotes signicance at
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 4: Risk Taking: Robustness
Dep Variable Risky Share Std Dev Beta
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ambig Averse 0.072 0.072 0.002 0.002 0.045 0.044
(0.028)** (0.029)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.019)** (0.019)**
Risk Averse 0.001 -0.001 -0.016
(0.03) (0.01) (0.018)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 35634 35634 35689 35689 36333 36333
Number of Clusters 310 310 334 334 344 344
R-squared 0.1 0.1 0.089 0.09 0.131 0.132
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions. The sample includes only risky
contracts. In columns 1-2, the dependent variable is the value of the risky assets over the
total value of the contract. In columns 3-4, the dependent variable is the standard deviation
of the returns of the contract in the previous 12 months. In columns 5-6, the dependent
variable beta is obtained by regressing the returns in the previous 12 months on the French
stock market index CAC40. Controls include age, gender, education, marital status, income,
nancial assets and total wealth. Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level,
are in brackets. ,  and  denotes signicance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 5: Change in Risk Exposure
Dep Variable Total Change Active Change
Absolute Relative Absolute Relative
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ambig Averse -0.068 -0.063 -0.068 -0.06
(0.033)** (0.029)** (0.032)** (0.029)**
Risk Averse -0.048 -0.031 -0.047 -0.035
(0.034) (0.029) (0.032) (0.029)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 76365 34990 76365 33997
Number of Clusters 451 310 451 310
R-squared 0.219 0.199 0.211 0.094
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions. In column
1, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the total change
in the risk prole exceeds in absolute value the median in the sample.
In column 2, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the
relative change in the risk prole exceeds in absolute value the median
in the sample. In column 3, the dependent variable is a dummy equal
to one if the active change in the risk prole exceeds in absolute value
the median in the sample. In column 4, the dependent variable is a
dummy equal to one if the relative active change in the risk prole
exceeds in absolute value the median in the sample. Controls include
age, gender, education, marital status, income, nancial assets and
total wealth. Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual
level, are in brackets. ,  and  denotes signicance at 10%, 5%
and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 6: Chasing Returns
Dep Variable Chaser
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ambig Averse -0.017 -0.02 -0.016 -0.02 -0.016 -0.016
(0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)**
Risk Averse -0.003 -0.007 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 -0.002
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Good Times 0.035
(0.009)***
Overperform 0.042
(0.012)***
Improve 0.142
(0.012)***
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies No No Yes No Yes Yes
Number of Obs 30012 27020 27020 26995 26992 26983
Number of Clusters 325 291 291 291 291 291
R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.157 0.002 0.158 0.172
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy
equal to one if the ratio between active change and passive change in the risky share is strictly
positive, and zero if the ratio is strictly negative. Active change and passive change are dened in
equations (6) and (5) respectively. Good Times is a dummy equal to one if the average monthly
returns observed in a given month exceed the median returns in our sample. Overperform is a
dummy equal to one if current returns exceed the median returns in that month. Improve is
a dummy equal to one if the di¤erence between current and past returns exceeds the median
di¤erence in the same period. Controls include age, gender, education, marital status, income,
nancial assets and total wealth. Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are
in brackets. ,  and  denotes signicance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 7: Returns
Dep Variable Monthly Returns (in %)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ambig Averse 0.017 0.014 0.014 0.015 -0.034 -0.044
(0.009)* (0.008)* (0.008)* (0.008)* (0.046) (0.046)
Risk Averse -0.019 -0.016 -0.017 -0.017 -0.001 0.0001
(0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.046) (0.046)
Risky Share 0.111
(0.023)***
Std Dev 3.692 2.082 3.684
(0.928)*** (0.997)** (0.928)***
Beta 0.131
(0.033)***
Good*Ambig 0.106 0.116
(0.092) (0.091)
Good*Risk -0.036 -0.035
(0.09) (0.089)
Good Times 0.664
(0.062)***
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Number of Obs 76921 76281 75703 76921 75396 75396
Number of Clusters 452 451 452 452 452 452
R-squared 0.204 0.208 0.207 0.205 0.124 0.207
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the monthly
returns of the contract in percentage points. Risky Share is the value of the risky assets over the
total value of the contract. Std Dev is the standard deviation of the returns of the contract in the
previous 12 months. Beta is obtained by regressing the returns in the previous 12 months on the
French stock market index CAC40. Good Times is a dummy equal to one if the average monthly
returns observed in a given month exceed the median returns in our sample. Good*Ambig refers
to the interaction between Good Times and Ambig Averse. Good*Risk refers to the interaction
between Good Times and Risk Averse. Controls include age, gender, education, marital status,
income, nancial assets and total wealth. Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level,
are in brackets. ,  and  denotes signicance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 8: Returns and Risk
Dep Variable Monthly Returns (in %)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ambig Averse 0.037 0.037 0.033 0.034 -0.096 -0.132
(0.017)** (0.016)** (0.017)* (0.017)* (0.062) (0.062)**
Risk Averse -0.033 -0.033 -0.036 -0.032 -0.042 -0.038
(0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.061) (0.06)
Risky Share 0.014
(0.031)
Std Dev 1.686 -0.829 1.685
(1.385) (1.564) (1.378)
Beta 0.073
(0.048)
Good*Ambig 0.299 0.326
(0.121)** (0.121)***
Good*Risk 0.006 0.005
(0.116) (0.115)
Good Times 1.403
(0.079)***
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Number of Obs 34855 34215 34261 34855 34261 34261
Number of Clusters 338 309 329 338 329 329
R-squared 0.43 0.439 0.435 0.43 0.278 0.438
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the monthly
returns of the contract in percentage points. Risky Share is the value of the risky assets over the
total value of the contract. Std Dev is the standard deviation of the returns of the contract in the
previous 12 months. Beta is obtained by regressing the returns in the previous 12 months on the
French stock market index CAC40. Good Times is a dummy equal to one if the average monthly
returns observed in a given month exceed the median returns in our sample. Good*Ambig refers
to the interaction between Good Times and Ambig Averse. Good*Risk refers to the interaction
between Good Times and Risk Averse. Controls include age, gender, education, marital status,
income, nancial assets and total wealth. Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual
level, are in brackets. ,  and  denotes signicance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 9: Other Behavioral Traits
Dep Variable Risky Contract High Risk Total Change Chaser Monthly Returns (in %)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ambig Averse -0.015 0.117 -0.066 -0.016 0.014 0.035
(0.042) (0.040)*** (0.033)** (0.008)* (0.008)* (0.015)**
Risk Averse -0.047 0.032 -0.049 -0.005 -0.017 -0.036
(0.043) (0.041) (0.034) (0.009) (0.008)** (0.015)**
Compute Interest 0.002 -0.043 -0.007 0.003 -0.006 -0.014
(0.043) (0.04) (0.033) (0.009) (0.008) (0.016)
Condence 0.037 0.017 0.039 -0.005 0.009 0.02
(0.043) (0.041) (0.033) (0.009) (0.008) (0.015)
Hyperbolic 0.039 0.044 0.017 0.003 -0.01 -0.022
(0.052) (0.046) (0.037) (0.012) (0.009) (0.018)
Risky Share 0.111 0.015
(0.023)*** (0.031)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 77700 35634 76365 27020 76281 34215
Number of Clusters 451 310 451 291 451 309
R-squared 0.053 0.117 0.221 0.157 0.208 0.439
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions. In column 1, the dependent variable is a dummy
equal to 1 if the contract contains some risky asset. In column 2, the sample includes only risky contracts
and the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the value of the risky assets over the total value of
the contract exceeds the median in the sample (that is equal to 0.51). In column 3, the dependent variable
is a dummy equal to one if the total change in the risk prole exceeds in absolute value the median in the
sample (that is equal to zero). In column 4, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the ratio
between active change and passive change in the risky share is strictly positive, and zero if the ratio is
strictly negative. Active change and passive change are dened in equations (6) and (5) respectively. In
columns 5-6, the dependent variable is the monthly returns of the contract in percentage points. Compute
Interest is a dummy equal to 1 if the client could compute compound interest (see Appendix 8.1 for details).
Condence is a dummy equal to 1 if the client reports a high level of condence (see Appendix 8.1 for
details). Hyperbolic is a dummy equal to 1 if the client has present biased preferences (see Appendix 8.1
for details). Risky Share is the value of the risky assets over the total value of the contract. Controls
include age, gender, education, marital status, income, nancial assets and total wealth. Robust standard
errors, clustered at the individual level, are in brackets. ,  and  denotes signicance at 10%, 5% and
1% level, respectively.
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Table 10: Fraction of Wealth Invested
Dep Variable Risky Contract High Risk Total Change Chaser Monthly Returns (in %)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ambig Averse -0.083 0.123 -0.101 -0.024 0.018 0.048
(0.055) (0.055)** (0.043)** (0.011)** (0.010)* (0.021)**
Risk Averse -0.043 0.041 -0.066 0.006 -0.016 -0.033
(0.056) (0.053) (0.042) (0.011) (0.01) (0.021)
Low Invest*Ambig 0.175 -0.059 0.089 0.012 -0.017 -0.048
(0.080)** (0.085) (0.069) (0.016) (0.015) (0.029)*
Low Invest*Risk -0.007 0.006 0.049 -0.025 0.005 0.013
(0.083) (0.081) (0.068) (0.016) (0.013) (0.029)
Low Invest -0.082 0.114 -0.082 0.024 0.014 0.036
(0.067) (0.069)* (0.057) (0.012)* (0.015) (0.025)
Risky Share 0.105 0.003
(0.021)*** (0.029)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 77310 35369 75989 26809 75894 33953
Number of Clusters 443 306 443 288 443 305
R-squared 0.058 0.119 0.22 0.159 0.208 0.44
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions. In column 1, the dependent variable is a dummy
equal to 1 if the contract contains some risky asset. In column 2, the sample includes only risky contracts
and the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the value of the risky assets over the total value of
the contract exceeds the median in the sample (that is equal to 0.51). In column 3, the dependent variable
is a dummy equal to one if the total change in the risk prole exceeds in absolute value the median in the
sample (that is equal to zero). In column 4, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the ratio
between active change and passive change in the risky share is strictly positive, and zero if the ratio is
strictly negative. Active change and passive change are dened in equations (6) and (5) respectively. In
columns 5-6, the dependent variable is the monthly returns of the contract in percentage points. Low Invest
is a dummy equal to 1 if the fraction of wealth invested in the contracts is below the median in the sample
(equal to 0.06). Low Invest*Ambig refers to the interaction between Low Invest and Ambig Averse. Low
Invest*Risk refers to the interaction between Low Invest and Risk Averse. Risky Share is the value of the
risky assets over the total value of the contract. Controls include age, gender, education, marital status,
income, nancial assets and total wealth. Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are in
brackets. ,  and  denotes signicance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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